Play 1: The Gateway Play · Play 2: The Blue Economy Play
INVESTMENT GUIDEYou know nothing about Mauritius finance or ocean economy. By the end, you'll understand exactly how money flows, what to invest in, what could go wrong, and what your next 5 steps should be. No jargon unexplained.
Mauritius isn't rich because 1.4 million people buy a lot of stuff. It's rich because it sits at a toll booth between India, Europe, and Africa — and charges fees for capital to pass through. That's the Gateway Play.
It also controls 1.9 million km² of ocean — an area larger than Saudi Arabia — that's barely being used. That's the Blue Economy Play.
These two plays account for the majority of Mauritius's real wealth generation. Everything else (the malls, the construction, the luxury hotels) is a downstream effect of these two engines.
| PLAY 1: THE GATEWAY 🏦 | PLAY 2: BLUE ECONOMY 🌊 | |
|---|---|---|
| What you do | Own/operate financial plumbing that routes capital | Own/operate ocean assets that produce food, pharma, minerals |
| Risk level | Low — proven model, predictable fees | Medium — unproven at scale, capital-intensive |
| Return profile | Moderate — 8-15% IRR, steady cash flows | High — 20%+ IRR possible, long ramp (5-8yr) |
| Capital needed | $500K-$5M to start | $2M-$20M depending on segment |
| Time to revenue | 6-12 months | 2-5 years |
| Key moat | Regulatory licences + treaty network (can't copy) | EEZ territory (nobody else has it) |
India has companies that want to invest in Africa. Africa has companies that want to reach European markets. Europe has funds that want to invest in India. Every time money crosses borders, it needs a legal address, a tax-efficient structure, and a bank account. Mauritius provides all three — and charges fees for the privilege.
That's the Gateway Play in one sentence: you build the plumbing, and every dollar that flows through pays you a toll.
1. An Indian tech company wants to buy a fintech startup in Kenya for $100M.
2. Direct India→Kenya: 20% capital gains tax in India + withholding tax in Kenya. Total tax: ~$25M gone.
3. Through Mauritius: Indian company sets up a Global Business Company (GBC) in Mauritius. The GBC buys the Kenyan fintech. Under the India-Mauritius Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), capital gains are taxed in Mauritius at 0-3%. Under the Mauritius-Kenya DTAA, withholding tax drops to 5-10%.
4. Total tax saved: $15-20M. Mauritius earns: incorporation fees, annual licence fees, fund administration fees, legal fees, accounting fees — maybe $150K-300K per year on this one structure.
5. Now multiply by 450+ private equity funds and thousands of GBCs doing exactly this, every year, for decades.
Mauritius doesn't need to own the capital. It just needs to be the address the capital uses. That's why 14% of GDP comes from financial services — but the indirect multiplier (legal, accounting, real estate, retail) pushes it to 40-50%.
GBC (Global Business Company): A company incorporated in Mauritius specifically to do business outside Mauritius. Like a Delaware LLC, but for cross-border Africa/India deals. DTAA (Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement): A treaty between two countries that says 'we won't tax the same income twice.' Mauritius has 46+ of these, including with India, UK, France, South Africa, and most of Africa. IFC (International Financial Centre): A jurisdiction that specialises in cross-border financial services. Think London, Singapore, Dubai — but Mauritius is the one for Africa. Fund Administration: The back-office work for investment funds — calculating NAV, processing subscriptions/redemptions, compliance reporting, investor communications. Boring but essential, and Mauritius does it cheaper than London/Singapore.
450+ PE funds × average $200M AUM = $90B+ under administration. Average admin fee of 0.05% = $45M/year just in fund admin. Add compliance, legal, accounting, directorship: total market is $200-400M/year. That's the direct revenue. The indirect multiplier (law firms, banks, accounting, real estate, retail spend by 10,000+ finance professionals) pushes economic impact to $1-2B/year.
A moat is what protects your business from competitors. Mauritius has one of the deepest moats in global finance. Here's why Dubai, Rwanda, or Cape Town can't just 'be the next Mauritius':
| MOAT LAYER | WHAT IT IS | WHY IT'S HARD TO COPY |
|---|---|---|
| 46+ DTAA Treaties | Tax treaties with India, UK, France, South Africa, and 40+ other countries | Treaties take 5-10 years to negotiate and ratify. Each is bilateral — you need BOTH countries to agree. Rwanda has 8 treaties. Mauritius has 46+ |
| Regulatory Track Record | FATF-compliant, removed from grey list (2021), OECD white-listed | Trust takes decades to build. One blacklisting event destroys years of work. Mauritius has survived multiple EU reviews |
| Legal System | Hybrid French civil code + English common law | You can't legislate a legal tradition. Mauritius inherited 300+ years of French + British law. This makes contracts enforceable for both European and African investors |
| Bilingual Workforce | English + French fluency across finance professionals | Takes a generation to build. Africa's other IFCs are monolingual (English for Rwanda/Dubai, French for Casablanca) |
| Network Effects | 450+ PE funds, 20+ banks, 100+ law firms, Big 4 accounting all present | Funds attract service providers. Service providers attract more funds. Cold-start problem — Rwanda has maybe 10 funds |
| GBC Licence Scarcity | Only ~350 licensed management companies can set up GBCs | Bank of Mauritius controls issuance. New licences require proof of substance (office, staff, expertise). Not trivially obtainable |
What: Buy a licenced GBC management company that already has 20-50 client entities under administration.
Why: You get the licence, the client book, and the recurring revenue on day one. No cold-start problem.
Capital needed: $1-3M (typically 3-5x annual revenue)
Revenue on acquisition: $300K-800K/year recurring
How to find targets: Talk to the Mauritius Financial Services Commission (FSC) for a list of licensed management companies. Engage a local corporate finance advisor (EMC, KPMG Mauritius, or AXYS). Many smaller management company owners are approaching retirement and looking for exit.
Timeline: 3-6 months from LOI to close
Best for: someone with $1-3M who wants immediate cash flow and a platform to grow from. Lowest execution risk.
What: Apply for a GBC management licence from the FSC and build from scratch.
Why: Lower capital outlay. You control the culture and client selection.
Capital needed: $200-500K (regulatory capital + office + staff + 18 months runway)
Revenue timeline: 12-18 months to first client, 3 years to break-even
Licence requirements: 2 qualified directors (ACIS or equivalent), physical office in Mauritius, minimum 2 full-time employees, clean fit-and-proper checks on all shareholders/directors, business plan approved by FSC
Key risk: Cold start — no clients on day one. You're competing against established firms with decades of relationships.
Best for: someone with deep Africa/India deal networks who can bring their own clients. High relationship risk, low capital risk.
What: Build software that automates GBC compliance — AML/KYC checks, beneficial ownership registers, CRS/FATCA reporting, annual return filing.
Why: Every GBC and management company spends $30-80K/year on manual compliance. Software that cuts this to $10K/year with better accuracy is a no-brainer.
Capital needed: $100-300K (MVP build + 12 months runway)
Revenue model: SaaS subscription $500-2,000/month per management company. 350 licensed companies = $2-8M addressable market.
Edge: Mauritius's FSC is pushing digital compliance. First mover in this niche wins the entire island's compliance spend. Expandable to other IFCs (Seychelles, BVI, Cayman).
Best for: tech founders. Lowest capital, highest scalability, but you're selling to a conservative industry that's slow to adopt new software.
| REVENUE LINE | TYPICAL FEE | FREQUENCY | NOTES |
|---|---|---|---|
| GBC Incorporation | $3,000-8,000 | One-time | Setting up a new company for a client |
| Annual GBC Licence Fee | $1,500-3,500 | Annual | Paid to FSC, passed through with markup |
| Fund Administration | 0.02-0.10% of AUM | Annual | The big one. $200M fund = $40-200K/year |
| Registered Office Fee | $2,500-6,000 | Annual | Your address is the legal address. Pure margin. |
| Directorship Fees | $15,000-30,000 per director | Annual | Nominee directors on client boards. 3-5 per fund. |
| Compliance / AML | $20,000-50,000 | Annual | KYC, ongoing monitoring, regulatory reporting |
| Legal & Structuring | $10,000-50,000 | Per transaction | M&A, restructuring, IPOs |
| Bank Account Opening | $5,000-15,000 | One-time | Mauritian banks are picky. You earn for navigating this. |
Year 1: $350K revenue (setup fees dominate, 10 clients onboarded) Year 2: $700K (recurring kicks in, 20 clients) Year 3: $1.1M (30 clients, admin fees compound with AUM growth) Year 4: $1.5M (cross-sell legal, directorship, compliance) Year 5: $2.0M+ (mature book, potential acquisition target at 4-6x = $8-12M exit) Margin: 40-55% operating margin after staff and office costs. This is a high-margin, low-capex business.
| RISK | SEVERITY | LIKELIHOOD | IMPACT IF IT HAPPENS | MITIGANT |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| India treaty renegotiation | 🔴 Critical | Medium-High | 30-50% of GBC volume could relocate. The India DTAA is the single biggest driver of FDI flows through Mauritius. | India already weakened the treaty in 2016 and 2019 (limiting capital gains exemption). The remaining value is still significant. Diversify beyond India-origin capital. |
| EU/OECD blacklisting | 🔴 Critical | Medium | Being added to an EU blacklist kills reputation overnight. Funds would be forced to redomicile. | Mauritius has invested heavily in compliance. Removed from FATF grey list in 2021. EU review ongoing but government is responsive. |
| Competition from Rwanda/Dubai/Cape Town | 🟠 High | Medium | Rwanda is marketing itself as 'the next Mauritius.' Dubai has better infrastructure. Cape Town has talent. | None have 46+ treaties. None have the legal hybrid system. None have the network effects of 450+ funds. Moat holds. |
| Regulatory cost increases | 🟡 Medium | Medium | FSC raises compliance requirements → your costs go up, small management companies can't keep up | Actually good for established players — kills small competitors and consolidates market toward you |
| Crypto / DeFi bypassing traditional structures | 🟡 Medium | Low-Medium | If tokenised funds don't need a legal address, the whole GBC model erodes | Still very early. Regulators worldwide are forcing crypto into regulated structures, not away from them |
If India terminates or further guts the DTAA, $50B+ in annual FDI routing through Mauritius would find new paths. This is the single biggest risk to the Gateway Play. However, India has already extracted the concessions it wanted (2016: capital gains tax introduced; 2019: source-rule changes). The remaining treaty value is about withholding tax reduction, which still saves real money. Full termination is unlikely because Indian companies also benefit — they'd lose the tax efficiency too.
| PLAYER TYPE | EXAMPLES | STRENGTH | YOUR ADVANTAGE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global fiduciary groups | Vistra, TMF, Trident Trust | Scale, brand, global client base | They're expensive and slow. SMB clients get poor service. You can win on attention and speed. |
| Big 4 advisory | KPMG, EY, PwC Mauritius | Trust, audit relationships | They can't do pure administration profitably. They refer it out — to you potentially. |
| Local established firms | Intertrust Mauritius, ABC, Cim Group | Deep local networks, 20+ years | Many are complacent. Aging tech. Slow digital adoption. RegTech eats their lunch. |
| Boutique management co's | 20-50 small firms | Agile, personal service | Fragmented market. Many owners near retirement. Acquisition targets. |
| Banks (licenced) | SBM, MCB, AfrAsia | Banking licence = client captive | They do basic GBC but outsource fund admin. Partner, don't compete. |
Mauritius controls an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 1.9 million km². That's the ocean equivalent of owning all the land from London to Istanbul. Inside this zone, Mauritius has exclusive rights to everything: fish, minerals under the seabed, energy from waves and wind, genetic material from marine life.
Right now, this ocean territory generates maybe 10% of GDP — mostly from tuna fishing licenses and some aquaculture. But the potential is 5-10x that. The ocean economy is where Mauritius was with financial services in 1990: early days, huge upside, government actively pushing it.
EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone): Under international law (UNCLOS), a coastal nation controls all resources within 200 nautical miles of its coast. Mauritius's EEZ is 1.9M km² because it includes islands scattered across the Indian Ocean (Rodrigues, Agalega, St Brandon, and — controversially — the Chagos Archipelago). Aquaculture: Fish farming in the ocean. Instead of catching wild tuna, you raise them in ocean pens. Think cattle ranching, but underwater. Marine Biotech: Using organisms from the ocean to make pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and industrial products. Sponges, algae, deep-sea bacteria — many produce compounds you can't find on land. Seabed Mining: Extracting minerals from the ocean floor. Polymetallic nodules (nickel, cobalt, copper, manganese) sit on the abyssal plain. These are critical for EV batteries and electronics. Blue Carbon Credits: Ocean ecosystems (mangroves, seagrass, kelp) absorb CO₂ faster than forests. You can sell carbon credits for preserving or restoring them.
| OCEAN ASSET | CURRENT STATUS | POTENTIAL VALUE | WHY IT MATTERS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tuna stocks (skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye) | Licensed to EU/Asian fleets for ~$4M/yr in fees | $200-500M/yr if Mauritius processes its own catch | Mauritius imports tuna to process. It sells licenses to foreign boats who catch the fish, land it elsewhere, then Mauritius buys it back. Insane. |
| Aquaculture zones | Small-scale (400 tonnes/yr) | $50-200M/yr at scale (10,000+ tonnes) | Ocean conditions near Mauritius are ideal for tuna ranching. Feed cost is the main variable. |
| Seabed polymetallic nodules | Exploration licenses granted | $1-5B in mineral value (NI 43-101 estimates vary wildly) | Contains cobalt, nickel, copper, manganese — all critical for batteries. ISA (International Seabed Authority) regulates deep-sea mining. |
| Marine genetic resources | Almost zero exploitation | $100M+ in pharma licensing if compounds found | Deep-sea sponges and bacteria produce novel compounds. Pharma companies pay millions for promising leads. |
| Offshore renewable (wind/wave/current) | None deployed | $500M+ in energy + carbon credits | Indian Ocean has strong, consistent currents. Energy island concept under study. |
| Blue carbon (mangroves, seagrass) | Not yet monetised | $20-50M/yr in carbon credits | Mauritius has 15km² of mangroves and extensive seagrass beds. Restorable. |
| Coral reef tourism asset | Degraded but recoverable | $1B+ if reef health restored (tourism multiplier) | Coral bleaching is the threat. Reef restoration tech exists. Tourism depends on it. |
Mauritius claims the Chagos Archipelago (currently administered by UK as British Indian Ocean Territory). The International Court of Justice ruled in 2019 that the UK must return Chagos to Mauritius. If/when this happens, Mauritius's EEZ expands by another ~540,000 km² — and the Chagos area contains some of the richest tuna grounds and seabed mineral deposits in the Indian Ocean. This is a geopolitical wildcard worth billions in potential ocean rights.
Step 1: Wild juvenile tuna are caught in the open ocean using purse-seine nets.
Step 2: They're towed in nets to offshore pens near Mauritius (like giant underwater cages).
Step 3: For 6-18 months, they're fed sardines/fish meal and grown from ~10kg to ~40-80kg.
Step 4: Harvested and flash-frozen for export to Japan (sashimi-grade) and EU/EU markets.
The economics are simple: buy a wild fish for $10-20, feed it $50-80 of feed, sell it for $200-400. The margin is in the fattening — and sashimi-grade tuna from clean Indian Ocean water commands premium prices.
| METRIC | CONSERVATIVE | AGGRESSIVE |
|---|---|---|
| Pen capacity (tonnes) | 500 | 2,000 |
| Grow-out cycles per year | 1.5 | 2 |
| Annual production (tonnes) | 750 | 4,000 |
| Sale price per kg (sashimi-grade) | $12 | $18 |
| Annual revenue | $9M | $72M |
| Feed cost (60% of revenue) | $5.4M | $43M |
| Operating costs (15% of revenue) | $1.35M | $10.8M |
| EBITDA | $2.25M | $18.2M |
| Capital required (pens + vessels + feed) | $8-15M | $30-50M |
| Time to first harvest | 12-18 months | 12-18 months |
| Break-even | Year 3 | Year 2 |
1. Capital — tuna ranching needs $10-50M upfront. Most Mauritian fishing companies are family operations with $500K-$2M capital. 2. Expertise — you need marine biologists, vessel operators, and supply chain for sashimi-grade export. Mauritius has the fishing tradition but not the aquaculture engineering tradition. 3. Feed supply — you need consistent fish meal (from sardines/mackerel). Mauritius's small pelagic fishery is underdeveloped. 4. Risk — one cyclone can destroy your pens. One disease outbreak can wipe out a year's production. This is exactly why a JV between a Mauritian licence holder and foreign capital/expertise is the winning move.
The ocean produces 80% of all novel chemical compounds discovered in the last 20 years that have pharmaceutical potential. Marine sponges, tunicates, soft corals, deep-sea bacteria — these organisms evolved under extreme conditions (pressure, salinity, no light) and produce molecules that nothing on land can make.
How it works commercially:
1. Collect marine organisms (dives, ROVs, sediment samples)
2. Extract compounds and screen for bioactivity (anti-cancer, anti-inflammatory, anti-microbial)
3. Patent promising compounds
4. License to pharma companies for clinical development
5. Earn royalties (1-5% of drug revenue) if a drug reaches market
Eribulin (brand name Halaven) is a breast cancer drug derived from a marine sponge. It generates $300M+ per year in sales for Eisai (Japanese pharma). The original sponge compound came from a sea hare collected off the coast of... a small island nation. The royalty stream, had it been negotiated properly, would be worth $3-15M per year for decades.
Mauritius sits in one of the most biodiverse marine regions on Earth. The deep waters around the island and Chagos are largely unexplored biologically. A single compound discovery could generate more revenue than the entire current fishing industry.
Marine biotech is a lottery ticket with a $100M+ jackpot. You need 10-15 years and $5-10M in screening before you know if you've won. But if you have — it's transformational.
On the ocean floor at 3,000-5,000m depth, there are polymetallic nodules — potato-sized lumps containing nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese. These are the exact materials needed for electric vehicle batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines. Demand is exploding and land-based supplies can't keep up.
The International Seabed Authority (ISA), based in Jamaica, regulates deep-sea mining in international waters. But within Mauritius's EEZ, Mauritius controls the rights directly.
| MINERAL | USE | 2024 PRICE TREND | WHY IT'S STRATEGIC |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cobalt | EV batteries, jet engines | ↑ Up 40% from 2023 lows | 70% comes from Congo (DRC) — ESG nightmare. Alternatives needed. |
| Nickel | Stainless steel, EV batteries | → Stable with upward bias | Indonesia dominates. Supply chain concentration risk. |
| Copper | Electrical wiring, renewables | ↑ At 2-year highs | Global copper deficit projected to hit 10M tonnes by 2035. |
| Manganese | Steel, batteries | → Stable | Essential for battery cathodes. South Africa/China dominate. |
Deep-sea mining is environmentally controversial. Scientists warn that disturbing the abyssal plain could destroy ecosystems we haven't even studied yet. The ISA has not yet finalised exploitation regulations — a moratorium movement is growing. The EU and several countries oppose deep-sea mining. Translation: the minerals are there, the demand is real, but you CANNOT assume you'll get a licence to extract. This is a 2028-2030 play at earliest, and only if the regulatory landscape clears. Play this as a long-term option, not a near-term revenue source.
What: Partner with a Mauritian company that already has fishing licences and ocean access. You bring capital + aquaculture expertise. They bring local licences + relationships + regulatory knowledge.
Capital needed: $2-5M for tuna ranching JV
Why JV: Foreigners can't hold fishing licences directly. You need a local partner with at least 51% ownership (though economic benefit can be structured differently).
Who to approach: Mauritius Seafood Processors Association, Indian Ocean Tuna Company (IOT), existing tuna processing plants in Port Louis. The Ministry of Blue Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping.
Structure: Mauritius entity (GBC or local company) with 51/49 ownership. You fund pens, feed, and expertise. They contribute licences, crew, and local permits.
Timeline: 6-12 months to JV agreement. 12-18 months to first harvest.
Best for: someone with $2-5M and patience. Fastest path to aquaculture revenue. Low regulatory risk because you're riding an existing licence.
What: Apply to the Ministry of Blue Economy for an aquaculture concession (ocean area allocation + licence).
Capital needed: $5-15M (concession fees + infrastructure + vessels + 2-year operating runway)
Process: Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) required. Ministry evaluation. Public consultation. Approval by Cabinet. Total: 12-24 months before you can put a pen in the water.
Advantage: You own 100% of the economics. No JV partner to share profits with.
Key requirement: Must demonstrate technical capability and financial capacity. A partnership with a Norwegian or Japanese aquaculture operator strengthens your application massively.
Best for: well-capitalised operators with aquaculture track record. Higher control, higher capital, longer timeline.
What: Set up a marine bioprospecting operation — collect marine organisms, screen for bioactive compounds, license discoveries to pharma companies.
Capital needed: $1-3M (lab equipment, research vessel time, screening programme, 3-year runway)
Team needed: Marine chemist + pharmacologist + patent attorney + field collection team
Revenue timeline: 5-10 years to first licensing deal (if you find a hit). Zero revenue until then.
De-risk strategy: Partner with University of Mauritius (marine science department) and a European/American pharma company under an 'access and benefit sharing' (ABS) agreement. They fund screening; you provide samples and local rights.
Best for: patient capital with science background. Highest risk, highest potential payoff. Think venture capital economics — 1 in 10 compounds might work, but that 1 could be worth $100M+.
| RISK | SEVERITY | LIKELIHOOD | MITIGANT |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cyclone destroys ocean pens | 🔴 Critical | Medium (1 major cyclone every 3-5 years) | Insurance exists but expensive. Submersible pen technology reduces damage. Location selection (lee side of island) helps. |
| Regulatory uncertainty — no clear aquaculture framework | 🟠 High | Medium | Ministry of Blue Economy is new (created 2021). Framework is being built. Being early = you help shape the rules. Being late = you follow them. |
| Capital intensity / cash burn before revenue | 🟠 High | High | Tuna ranching needs $10-50M before first sale. Budget 50% overruns. Secure 24+ months of operating capital before starting. |
| Disease outbreak in fish pens | 🟠 High | Medium | All aquaculture faces this. Biosecurity protocols, vaccination, and species diversification reduce risk. |
| Chagos sovereignty dispute unresolved | 🟡 Medium | Medium | Without Chagos, EEZ is still ~1.3M km². With Chagos, it's 1.9M km². The extra 540K km² is upside, not baseline. |
| Seabed mining moratorium | 🟡 Medium | Medium-High | Don't bank on seabed mining for near-term revenue. Treat it as a long-term option. Focus on aquaculture and biotech first. |
| Climate change — ocean warming | 🟡 Medium | High | Warming waters may shift tuna migration patterns. May reduce yields. May also open new species. Monitor and adapt. |
| Foreign partner expropriation risk | 🟡 Medium | Low | Mauritius has strong property rights and rule of law. Not a typical expropriation risk country. But always structure with international arbitration clauses. |
| YEAR | INVESTMENT | REVENUE | EBITDA | STATUS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | $3M (pens, feed, licences, vessel) | $0 | -$2.8M | Build-out. No harvest yet. Fish growing. |
| Year 2 | $1.5M (feed, operations) | $4.5M (first harvest) | $0.5M | First harvest! Break-even on operating costs. |
| Year 3 | $1.0M (expanding pens) | $9M (2 cycles) | $2.5M | Compounding. 2 grow-out cycles per year. |
| Year 4 | $0.5M (maintenance) | $13.5M | $5M | Scale achieved. Considering expansion. |
| Year 5 | $0.5M | $18M+ | $7M+ | Mature operation. Potential for acquisition or IPO. |
Total invested: ~$6.5M over 5 years Cumulative EBITDA by Year 5: ~$15M+ IRR: 25-35% if projections hold Exit: Strategic sale to Japanese/Norwegian aquaculture group at 5-8x EBITDA = $35-56M The key risk is Year 1-2 cash burn with no revenue. You MUST have capital reserves for 24+ months before starting.
Books: • 'The Mauritius Miracle' — Subramanian (economic history) • 'The Outlaw Ocean' — Urbina (ocean governance reality) • 'Blue Economy' — Gunter Pauli (ocean business models) Reports (free online): • Global Financial Centre Index (GFCI) — ranks Mauritius among African IFCs • World Bank Mauritius Country Report — macroeconomic overview • Mauritius EDB Annual Report — government investment priorities • ISA Annual Report — seabed mining regulatory status Key websites: • fscmauritius.org — Financial Services Commission • edbmauritius.org — Economic Development Board • blueconomy.govmu.org — Ministry of Blue Economy • mcbgroup.com — MCB research & economic analysis People to know: • Renganaden Padayachy — Minister of Finance • Sudheer Maudhoo — Minister of Blue Economy • FSC Commissioners — regulatory gatekeepers • MCB/SBM senior bankers — the ones who open accounts for your clients